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INTRODUCTION
There is an inherent tension between an original creation and
its subsequent reinvention or distortion, which is increasingly
* Liz Somerstein, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2009, University of Miami
School of Law; B.A., 2006, Emory University. Special thanks to my parents, Marla
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problematic for large corporations.' Opponents of the recent
proliferation of corporate attempts to expand the scope of their
intellectual property rights2 have commented that the growth of
the intellectual property disputes between corporate icons and
their subsequent users is not logical or correct, but rather it is a
product of frivolous lawsuits and sheer intimidation tactics.'
The Mattel Corporation ("Mattel") is no exception to this
international trend of utilizing aggressive litigation in an attempt
to increase the scope of its intellectual property rights. In fact, "it's
no secret California-based Mattel, Inc. has taken great measures
to protect the image of its legendary Barbie doll ... [and] the com-
pany's aggressiveness often has taken Barbie from her Malibu
dream house to a U.S. courthouse."4 For example, in 1998 Mattel
brought legal action against MCA Records for trademark infringe-
ment and dilution associated with a song' that satirized the
Barbie trademark.6 In a 2002 decision,7 the 9th Circuit Court con-
firmed the idea that Mattel's actions were overly aggressive and
held there was no such infringement, further advising Mattel "to
chill."8
A comment on Mattel's Barbie icon provoked more than law-
suits. For example, in 1989 "[c]ritics of the "Barbie ideal"9 created
the Barbie Liberation Organization ("BLO"), "a project of 'culture-
jamming' ® TMARK ("art-mark"), to stage cultural events that
mock[ed] the doll."' ° Of note was the infamous BLO prank wherein
members switched the voice boxes of approximately 300 talking
versions of G.I. Joe and Barbie dolls, and at the pull of a string the
mottled image of Barbie shouted: "Vengeance is mine.""
1. See, DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL
CULTURE (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id.; See also, Tom Forsythe Artsurdism, http://creativefreedomdefense.org/
biofoodchain.cfm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) (commenting "Corporations proceed
quietly, below the radar of public scrutiny, merely by making a business decision to
throw their intimidating wealth in the face of hapless artists.").
4. Dan Trigoboff, Ruling Keeps Barbie at Bottom of Food Chain, 3/04 Corp. Legal
Times 54, (col.1)(2004).
5. The song at issue was Danish band Aqua's hit single entitled "Barbie Girl."
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d 1120 (C.D.Cal.,1998).
6. Id.
7. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (2002).
8. Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 908.
9. BOLLIER, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Id. As an additional aspect of the prank, G.I. Joe was rigged to say, "Let's plan
our dream wedding." id.
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Mattel is at war in both the United States and Canada, per-
petually fighting for the right to protect its Barbie copyright and
trademark. Embracing this war ideology, Mattel's attorneys sent
mock hand grenades to prospective clients, affixing a note stating
they will "go to war" for them.12 This aggressive and ruthless
approach earned Mattel the repute as a brand-name bully 3 and
perpetual Goliath. 4 This "disturbing trend"'5 is critiqued as a
mere "paranoid overreaction of an over-layered corporation," 6
whose abuse of copyright and trademark law has caused a stifling
and arcane "zone of the illegal imagination." 7 This note argues
that Mattel, however, is not an overreacting Goliath and paranoid
bully; its dogmatic litigation strategy is defensible and justified
when looked at under the lens of Legal Realism.
Part I of this note outlines the theoretical underpinnings of
Legal Realism, a school of thought couched in the understanding
of the inherent fluidity of the law. Part II examines Mattel's suit
brought in spite of entrenched American copyright law in the case
of Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Production." Part III justifies
this American battle for Barbie by considering Mattel's corporate
litigation strategy in light of two core tenets of Legal Realism -
ambiguity of legal language and the role of distinctive fact situa-
tions and contexts. Part IV examines a similar fight against
entrenched Canadian trademark law in the case of Mattel, Inc. v.
3894207 Canada, Inc.'9 ("BARBIE"), noting the evolution of the
relevant legal framework. Part V provides justification for Mat-
tel's actions, with a particular emphasis on the immediate effect of
shifting Canadian trademark jurisprudence. Part VI concludes by
suggesting that, in light of Legal Realist philosophy, Mattel's
aggressive international battles to protect its Barbie copyright
and trademark is not only justifiable, but has the added benefit of
12. Tom Forsythe Artsurdism, http://creativefreedomdefense.org/bio-foodchain.
cfm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
13. BOLLIER, supra note 1.
14. Editorial, Throwing Barbie on the Barbie ruled OK, if it's art, The Austr.
(Australia), July 3, 2004, at 1 (commenting on Mattel's reputation in the United
States); Putting Barbie on the Barbie, Daily Tel. (Sydney, Australia), May 28, 2005
(commenting on Mattel's reputation in Canada by stating, "A Canadian restaurant
owner in invoking Australian slang in its defense in a David and Goliath court battle
against US toymaker Mattel.").
15. BOLLIER, supra note 1, at 5.
16. BOLLIER, supra note 1, at 16.
17. BOLLIER, supra note 1, at 12.
18. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Production, 353 F.3d 792 (2003).
19. Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772 (2006).
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slowly reshaping entrenched intellectual property laws in both the
United States and Canada.
I. LEGAL REALISM: AN OVERVIEW
Legal Realist philosophy seeks to recast legal reasoning in
terms of active reason and views the law as "less a matter of the
invariable application of norms.., and more a matter of equitable
[and] variable, discretion on the part of officials of the state."20
Legal Realists do not conform to the traditional understanding of
the rule of law, but rather view rules "not with reference to princi-
ples but... with respect to considerations of policy, [and] social
advantage."21
According to the Legal Realist philosophy, the inherent fluid-
ity and indeterminacy of the law is exemplified in the ambiguity of
legal language, social and economic change, distinctive fact situa-
tions and contexts, as well as the psychological interplay of judge-
made decisions.22 Skeptical of traditional jurisprudence,23 a fixed
rule of law is a fallacy as "[r]ight-minded and informed men can-
not be expected always to reach the same conclusions."24 This
doubt of the traditional notion of prescribed and exacting legal
rules underscores the Realist's notion that the law is fluid. It is a
paradoxical understanding that the true understanding of the law
is liquid; cases have the ability to change the law as quickly as
currents through the sea or as slowly as glass turns to liquid.25
Throughout the 1930's and into the 1940's, Legal Realism's
theoretical analysis of jurisprudence was widely celebrated, yet its
eminence as a preeminent school of legal thought has slowly lost
20. Christopher Shannon, The Dance of History (Book Review), 8 Yale J.L. &
Human. 495, 497 (1996) (citing JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE, at xii, 418, 44 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press)(1995).
21. Christopher Shannon, The Dance of History (Book Review), 8 Yale J.L. &
Human. 495, 497 (1996) (citing JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE, at xii, 418, 226 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press)(1995); See also, KARL LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, (10th ed. 1996).
22. WILFRID E. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE
JUDICLAL PROCESS, 63-69 (Cornell University Press 1968).
23. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 48.
24. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 235; See, LLEWELLYN, supra note 21 ("What these
officials do about disputes is. . .the law itself.").
25. Is Glass a Solid or An Extremely Slow Moving Liquid?, http://www.science
daily.com/releases/2007/08/070809130014.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008) (commenting
that it is merely scientific legend that glass is a liquid, however the concept remains
applicable).
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luster.26 The "inevitable question" as posed by Professor Wilfrid
Rumble is, "why a movement of such clear significance is no longer
the dynamic force which it once was?"27 There is no simple answer
to this question. Although "muted"2s over time, the contemporary
relevance and impact of the Legal Realist school of thought
29remains.
It is easy to overlook those cases that flow like glass: slow and
imperceptible to the naked eye, changing the law one molecule at
a time. Mattel, however, is an exemplar of a major corporation
wherein a loss at court has the positive effect of slowly shaping
international intellectual property law.
Based upon Mattel's philosophy to aggressively protect its
property rights, this note will address the legitimacy of Mattel's
international battles in the specific cases of Walking Mountain"
and BARBIE.3 1 Both reflect instances where Mattel fought and
lost in the wake of then existing status of the law. Although Mat-
tel lost at court, it is through these international legal battles that
the "contemporary relevance and impact of the legal realist school
of thought"32 triumphed, proving the axiom that one can lose the
battle but win the war.
II. MATTEL'S AMERICAN BATTLE: MATTEL, INC. V. WALKING
MOUNTAIN PRODUCTIONS
"She is tall and blonde and if you want to top her with
cheese and put her in the oven, you can."33
Copying, to a certain degree, is essential to creativity and the
birth of new ideas 4 in the face of expanding United States intel-
26. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 238.
27. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 238.
28. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 2-3; See, JEROME HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND CRIMINAL THEORY 136-142 (New York: Oceana 1958).
29. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 3.
30. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Production, 353 F,3d 792 (2003).
31. Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772 (2006).
32. RUMBLE, supra note 22.
33. Editorial, Throwing Barbie on the Barbie ruled OK, if it's art, The Austr.
(Australia), July 3, 2004, at 1.
34. In confirmation of this notion, psychological theory and "case studies (from
Mozart to Charlie Parker to the Beatles) demonstrate that an intense period of
immersion characterized by practice and rehearsal based on imitating and copying
the work of others is a necessary condition for creativity and innovation." Jane Bailey,
Deflating the Michelin Man: Protecting User's Rights in the Canadian Copyright
Reform Process (2005), http://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/lawpoli/copyright/geistbook/
2_02_Bailey.pdf.
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lectual property law (wherein the stated purpose is to protect the
advancement of "Progress," i.e., creativity). 5 This means that imi-
tation may no longer support the adage "sincerest form of flat-
tery," as originality is currently plagued by the irking sensation
that creation no longer is a pure and original endeavor. 36 Artists,
in particular, increasingly draw upon corporate images in the face
of this "precarious"37 depletion of original ideas. In response, cor-
porations are pigeonholed as "bullies,"" criticized for their "dis-
turbing"39 efforts to tighten the scope of the law in an attempt to
protect their original creative works from rebirth.6°
Mattel, specifically, has garnered the reputation as one of the
most litigious American corporations. With this repute arises a
metaphorical comparison to the biblical battle between David and
Goliath.41 Goliath represents a giant corporation consistently bat-
tling the smaller, less powerful David. Notwithstanding the sup-
portable legal frameworks, it is hard for the courts morally to
justify a ruling in favor of the big corporation, Goliath, Inc. This
aggressive strategy, however, is the only way Mattel is able to
eventually shape the law to their advantage, exemplifying the
Legal Realist conception of the fluid "indispensible dynamic qual-
ity of the law."42
Mattel's American battle of David and Goliath, in Walking
Mountain, is an archetypical example of how, even in the face of
defeat, its aggressive litigious stance has the added benefit of
slowly chipping away at the detrimentally entrenched American
copyright laws. In this instance, the Court found the case law and
relevant portion of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §107 ("US Act")
35. U.S. Const. Art. I, sec 8, cl. 8 (wherein the primary objective of copyright is
"[to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.").
36. Kimball Tyson, The Illegal Art Exhibit: Art or Exploitation? A Look At the Fair
Use Doctrine in Relation to Corporate Degenerate Art, 9 Computer L. Rev. & Tech. j.
425, 431(2005) (stating "when the idea of 'absolute novelty' as an impossibility has
survived for centuries, artists of the postmodern era feel as though they are in the
precarious situation of creating something new in a world where there is nothing new
to create.").
37. Tyson, supra note 37, at 431.
38. BOLLIER, supra note 1.
39. BOLLIER, supra note 1, at 5.
40. BOLLIER, supra note 1, at 4-5 (commenting "[there] is a radical expansion of the
scope of copyright and trademark law. The owners of intellectual property, especially
large entertainment industries, are asserting sweeping new rights of ownership and
control for themselves at the expense of the public and future creators.").
41. Editorial, supra note 14, at 1.
42. EDwARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (The University of
Chicago Press 1949).
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clearly against Mattel. Paradoxically, this pursuit allowed Mattel
to establish distinctions, which can then be used by Mattel to ulti-
mately swing the court into its favor.
The following analysis of Walking Mountain will discuss how
the Court's interpretation of the facts, as read in light of statutory
text and case law, led the Court to dismiss Mattel's infringement
claim. Under the guise of a Legal Realist lens, Mattel theoretically
did not lose. To be more precise, Walking Mountain is an exemplar
of two Legal Realist tenets that serve to shape the law through (1)
the ambiguity of legal language and (2) distinctive fact situations
and contexts.43
A. The Walking Mountain case: Background
Self-taught Utah artist Tom Forsythe, also known as Walking
Mountains Productions, is infamous for producing photographic
portraits with social and political overtones. In 1997, he created a
series of 78 photographs, entitled "Food Chain Barbie," ("the
series") which depicted Mattel's Barbie doll in a variety of incon-
gruous and erotic positions. Throughout this series, Forsythe used
the word "Barbie" to title some of the photographs featuring nude
and often sexualized Barbie dolls juxtaposed in compromising
positions among vintage kitchen appliances." In line with his rep-
utation, the series was created to address the social overtones of
the Barbie figure in the American culture, simultaneously com-
menting on "the objectification of women ... and the conventional
beauty myth."4 Forsythe stated that he was looking for a figure
that would "represent crass commercialism . . . [a]nd about two
seconds later [he] thought, 'Aha! Barbie!'' 4 6 Throughout this
attempt to lambast the beauty-obsessed consumer culture, For-
sythe maintains that the totality of the series justly exercised use
of his artistic expression to convey a serious message, while
retaining a blatantly humoristic overtone.47
The series was exhibited at two art festivals 4 and subse-
43. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 65-69.
44. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 796.
45. Id.
46. Editorial, supra note 14, at 1.
47. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 796. Forsythe carries this humor into all aspects of the
case. In December, 1999 "after Mattel. . .served Forsythe with its complaint, [he]
videotaped himself 'execut[ing]' his collection of Barbies. Forsythe claims he did this
to 'let off steam' and as a humorous statement." id. at 798 n.5.
48. The two festivals included the Park City Art Festival in Park City, Utah and
the Plaza Art Fair in Kansas City, Missouri. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 796.
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quently chosen for display in a variety of exhibitions.49 He pro-
moted the series through a postcard depicting the photo entitled
"Barbie Enchiladas," a business card describing himself as an
"Artsurdist" ° and a website depicting low-resolution pictures of
the series.51 Of the 2000 promotional postcards printed only 500
circulated,5 grossing Forsythe profits of merely $3,659. 53 Over half
of Forsythe's gross sales accrued from purchases by Mattel
investigators.54
Forsythe had an "entirely different idea about what to put
into a burrito," yet this humor was not appreciated by Mattel. On
August 23, 1999, Mattel filed an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California against Forsythe
alleging the series infringed on Mattel's copyright, trademark,
and trade dress. 56 Thereafter, Forsythe moved for summary judg-
ment and Mattel filed a cross-motion for summary judgment."
The District Court granted Forsythe's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that Forsythe's use of the Mattel copyrighted work
was fair and permissible.58 Additionally, the Court held that his
use of Mattel's trademark and trade dress caused no likelihood of
confusion to Mattel's sponsorship of the series.59 The District
Court dismissed the trademark dilution claim, finding that the
use was "noncommercial."60
49. Including an exhibition by the Deputy Director and Chief Curator of the
Guggenheim Museum of Modern Art in New York City. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 796
n.2.
50. Also depicted on the business card was his photo entitled "Champagne
Barbie." Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 797.
51. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 797. The series was not equipped for online purchasing
at the time of trial, but as an interesting postscript, the Barbie images are currently
for sale on Forsythe's website. Tom Forsythe Artsurdism, http://
creativefreedomdefense.orgResults.cfm?category=12 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
52. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 797 (detailing that some of the distributed postcards
circulated throughout his hometown of Kanab, and others to a feminist scholar who
used the series in her academic presentations. 180 of the postcards were also sold to a
Kanab bookstore owner, and personal friend of the artist, to be resold. 22 postcards
were sold to two other personal friends of the artist).
53. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 797.
54. Id. at 3.
55. Transcript of National Public Radio Morning Edition, Analysis: Federal
appeals court rules artist's depictions of Barbie being threatened by kitchen appliances
are a form of protected speech, Jan. 2, 2004.
56. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 797.
57. Id. at 798.
58. Id.
59. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 798.
60. Id.
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Mattel appealed the District Court's decision.61 Inevitably and
ironically, Forsythe's humor triumphed. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of California
affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment for For-
sythe commenting, "[C]opyrights don't protect Barbie from being
parodied or threatened by a food processor. "62
B. The Walking Mountain Court's Analysis
While it is undisputed that Mattel, as the owner of the copy-
righted Barbie doll, established a prima facie case of copyright
infringement due to Forsythe's Barbie photographs and reproduc-
tions of said photographs, 3 this note focuses on the core issue as to
whether Mattel was justified in their action against Forsythe.6 In
order to make this determination, one must look at the Court's
interpretation of the law in regards to Mattel's claim.6
Artistic license is more than a colloquial term; Forsythe's sar-
castic juxtaposition of classic and youthful cultural icons within
disturbing and depressing contexts is subject to the fair use excep-
tion of the U.S. Act. 6  Since the "evolution of creativity cannot
happen in a vacuum,"67 the affirmative fair use defense68 allows an
infringer limited use of a copyrighted work,69 so as to exclude
"from copyright restrictions certain [reasonable] works, such as
those that criticize and comment on another work."70 Fair use
61. Id. at 799.
62. Transcript of National Public Radio Morning Edition, Analysis: Federal
appeals court rules artist's depictions of Barbie being threatened by kitchen appliances
are a form of protected speech, Jan. 2, 2004; See also, Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 816.
63. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 799; See also, Dana Drexler, MATTEL INC. V.
WALKING MT. PRODS., 15 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 433, 436 (2005).
64. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 799; See also, Dana Drexler, MATTEL INC. V.
WALKING MT. PRODS., 15 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 433, 436 (2005).
65. Mattel Inc., 353 F,3d at 799; See also, Dana Drexler, MATTEL INC. V.
WALKING MT. PRODS., 15 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 433, 436 (2005).
66. Copyright, Commerce & Creativity, Financial Times Information Limited
(India), July 13, 2004, at 1.
67. Id.
68. 17 U.S.C. §107.
69. Brent A. Olson, et. al., Business Law Deskbook, Formation And Operation of
Businessess Current Through the 2007-2008 Update, 9 Ariz. Prac., Buisness Law
Deskbook §15:14 (2007).
70. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir.
2003); See also, 17 U.S.C. §107; Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding fair use "permits courts to avoid rigid application
of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which the
law is designed to foster."), cert. dismissed, 118 S.Ct. 27 (1997).
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determinations are made with a "flexible balancing"'" of the fol-
lowing four mandatory factors:
72
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.73
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,7' solidified that not only
are the aforementioned four factors necessary in a fair use deter-
mination, all four factors must be considered jointly. 5 Campbell
serves as extremely persuasive precedent in the interpretation of
fair use. Campbell, read jointly with the U.S. Act, emphasizes the
entrenchment of the fair use defense in United States jurispru-
dence. The Court heavily relies on both in making their own,
almost systematic and textbook, fair use analysis.
i. Purpose and character of use
The first of the four factors the Court considered in making
their fair use determination was "purpose and character of use"
with the subsequent relevant inquiry asking "'to what extent the
new work is transformative' and does not simply 'supplant' the
original work. 76 Whether a work is transformative is central to a
fair use analysis.77 Parody, considered a subset of transformative
works, comments or criticizes a work by appropriating aspects of
the original in the creation of the new.78 At the threshold of the
transformative determination is the perception of parody.7 9 Mat-
tel, supported by survey evidence, argued that a reasonable juror
could not conclude that Forsythe's series parodied Mattel's
Barbie.8° As the issue of parody is a question of law, not a matter
71. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800.
72. Howard B. Abrams, Chapter 15: Fair Use C. The Fair Use Analysis,
COPYLAW §15:31(2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. §107: "'[in determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include" the four specified factors."').
73. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800 (citing Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1399-1404).
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994).
75. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800; See also, Abrams, supra note 73.
76. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800 (citing Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1164).
77. See, Abrams, supra note 73.
78. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 801; Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400.
79. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800.
80. Id. at 801.
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of public opinion,81 the court refused to consider Mattel's survey
evidence. 2
Likewise, whether a parody arose in bad taste is not relevant
to a fair use determination." Over the years, Mattel has solidified
Barbie as an icon of "the ideal American woman and a symbol of
American girlhood."' Regardless of how one may feel about his
approach, 5 Forsythe turned Mattel's carefully crafted image "on
its head" 6 by positioning Barbie in ridiculous poses and dangerous
situations. 7 His use of lighting, background, props, and camera
angles all served to provide the viewer of the series with a differ-
ent set of associations and contexts for Mattel's sweetheart.88
The attempted commentary on gender roles is easy to glean
from the series of photographs in which Barbie is on the verge of
destruction from domestic staples, such as kitchen appliances,
while continually displaying her "well known smile, disturbingly
oblivious to her predicament."89 In other photographs in the series,
Forsythe comments on the position of women in society by posi-
tioning Barbie nude, in sexually suggestive situations. Inevita-
bly, the court found that Barbie's associations convey messages
about gender, social roles, and society in such a way that is ripe
for social commentary. 1 By transforming these associations, For-
sythe created a classic example of social criticism and parodic
speech encouraged by the U.S. Act and protected by the First
81. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 801 (citing Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 582-83).
82. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 801 (commenting that the "[ulse of surveys in
assessing parody would allow majorities to determine the parodic nature of a work
and possibly silence artistic creativity. Allowing majorities to determine whether a
work is a parody would be greatly at odds with the purpose of the fair use exception
and the Copyright Act.").
83. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 801. See also, Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 582-83.
84. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 802 (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894, 898 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003)).
85. Sick Barbie Artist Escapes the Chop, Sunday Mercury (Birmingham, UK)
March 14, 2004 (stating "An artist who photographed naked Barbie dolls, put them in
a blender and then cooked them, has been given the go-ahead to carry on with his sick
trade.") (emphasis added).
86. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 802.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 802; Editorial, supra note 14, at 1 ("His favourite is
Heatwave - a naked Barbie baking and basting in the orange glow of a rotisserie
oven. Sunbeams has the doll's taut posterior poking out above a Sunbeam mixer.
Others show the well-endowed plastic icon bathing in a martini glass and wallowing
in a wok.").
91. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 802.
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Amendment.92
The second element considered under the "purpose and char-
acter of use factor"93 is whether the "purpose" was commercial or
had a non-profit aim.94 Although conceded that Forsythe presuma-
bly intended to find a market for his art, the commercial expecta-
tions for his art did not weigh against him given the "extremely
transformative nature and parodic quality of [his] work."95
ii. Nature of the copyrighted work
The second factor considered under a fair use analysis is the
nature of the copyrighted work.96 The more creative the work, the
more protection it receives, with fictional works usually consid-
ered more "creative" than factual works. 97 The Court recognized
that Mattel's Barbie is a creative work; however one that is openly
subject to parody.98 Although not an extremely important factor in
the scheme of a fair use analysis, the Court did conclude that this
second factor weighed slightly against Forsythe.99
iii. Amount and substantiality of the portion used
The third factor involves a review of the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used, with the extent permissibly copied
varying with the purpose and character of its use.100 Mattel argued
that Forsythe could have used a lesser portion of the Barbie doll;
the Court found this argument without merit.0 1 First, the Court
found that Forsythe did not copy the work verbatim.0 2 Depending
on the angle or contextual obstructions, the entire head and body
of the Barbie doll were never on display in the series.10 3 The Court
found the third factor in favor of Forsythe and granted him the
92. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803.
93. 17 U.S.C. §107.
94. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803(citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584).
95. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803(citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985)).
96. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803; Olson, supra note 70.
97. Olson, supra note 70.
98. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803.
99. Id.
100. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87); See also,
Olson, supra note 70.
101. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 804.
102. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 803 (stating "A verbatim copy of Barbie would be an
exact three dimensional reproduction of the doll.").
103. The court noted that the majority of copyright infringement actions involve
works that are naturally severable, such as songs, videos, or written works; the new
work can easily severe select portions of the original and simply add to it. Due to the
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legal artistic license to create new from deconstructing the old,
therefore justifying the series as a reincorporation of the original
into a novel context, infused with new character. 10
iv. Effect upon the potential market
The fourth factor posed the question, was there actual market
harm to Mattel resulting from the series?" 5 Mattel argued that
the series could lead to potential market harm by impairing the
value of "Barbie itself, Barbie derivatives, and licenses for the use
of the Barbie name and/or likeness to non-Mattel entities."' 6 The
court rejected Mattel's contention and concluded that this market
substitution effect is highly unlikely given the parodic nature of
the series. 107
Eerily similar is the previous lawsuit brought by Mattel
against artist Susan Pitt; Pitt created a series of dolls, "Dungeon
Dolls," that were essentially Barbie dolls altered and dressed in
sadomasochistic attire.0 8 In Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt °9 the Southern
District Court of New York, analogous to the Walking Mountain
Court, found Pitt's work sufficiently transformative. The Court
held that most likely no danger to the potential market would
transpire because Mattel was highly unlikely to develop, or license
others to develop, an "'adult' doll market.""0 For the same reason,
Forsythe's series could only reasonably substitute photographs in
the market for "adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie.""'
The Court confidently assumed that Mattel would not enter, nor
license others to enter, this adult market."' After an analysis and
balance of the four aforementioned factors, the Court held that
Forsythe's series clearly amounted to fair use and affirmed the
District Court's grant of summary judgment."'
unique nature of the original work, the court justified Forsythe's contextual addition
captured in the photographs. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 804.
104. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 804.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 805.
107. Id. at 805.
108. Id. at 806.
109. Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F.Supp.2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
110. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 806 (citing Pitt, 229 F.Supp.2d at 324).
111. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 806.
112. The court concludes the analysis with confirming the overwhelming benefits to
the public by promoting free speech, artistic freedom, and social criticism. Mattel Inc.,
353 F.3d at 806.
113. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 800.
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III. AT LOOK AT WALKING MOUNTAIN UNDER THE LEGAL
REALIST LENS
A. Ambiguity of legal language
"Almost all legal sentences.., have a way of reading as though
they had been translated from German by someone with a rather
meager knowledge of English.""4 Legal Realists concede and
embrace the notion that legal language is ambiguous and not self-
expounding."' The Walking Mountain court made their ultimate
decision based on their interpretation of the fair use defense codi-
fied in the U.S. Act.
Statutory interpretation, at first blush, would not seem sub-
ject to the critical lens of the Legal Realist. Each word of a statute
has a particular meaning; in order to effectuate legislative intent,
every word must be read to reflect the exact nuance in which it
was written.1 6 This demanding nature of statutory language,
however, is just another feature of the constant ebb and flow that
eventually realigns the law."7 A statute can therefore be relaxed
from this rigid statement of strict legislative intent to that of a
general statement, "describ[ing] a general situation ... a picture
of which the outline is not solid steel, but rubber, or... a wreath of
smoke. It can be extended pretty widely and contracted pretty
narrowly. And if you are a little clever, it will catch or let out the
situation you are deciding.""' Legal Realist Edward Levi con-
tends that statutes are even more flexible and prone to manipula-
tion than case law."9 Mattel's aggressive corporate strategy, and
the fact that they sued in spite of the U.S. Act weighing so
strongly against it, evidences that Mattel has embraced the Legal
Realist's conception of ambiguity inherent in statutes.
The Walking Mountain Court happened to rule against Mat-
tel, but subsequent courts might have different interpretations of
the ambiguities of the statute. People individually make statutory
interpretations. Mattel's continual fight provides additional
opportunities for a fresh set of eyes to interpret and apply the stat-
114. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 63 (quoting Legal Realist - Fred Rodell).
115. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 66; JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 299 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) ("The
serpent in the imagined garden of Eden is the irrepressible semantic problem.").
116. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-534 (1960); SoTA
MENTSCHIKOFF & IRWIN P. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW 41
(1981).
117. LEVI, supra note 43, at 30.
118. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 64 (quoting Legal Realist - Max Radin).
119. See LEVI, supra note 43, at section III.
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ute. As an aggressive litigant, Mattel is advancing the Legal Real-
ist theory by fortifying its position through a reliance on the
ambiguity of legal language. Mattel's actions, therefore, are decid-
edly not without merit because (under a Legal Realist lens) there
is no true and solid interpretation of the fair use defense in the
U.S. Act. Further, not suing in an attempt to achieve a different
interpretation is considered bad corporate policy on Mattel's
behalf.
Additionally, in its interpretation of the ambiguous language
of the U.S. Act, the Court went as far as to attack Mattel's claim
as frivolous.12° In accord with notions of Legal Realism, calling
Mattel's claim "frivolous" is a harsh characterization. Frivolous is
defined as "having no sound basis (as in fact or law)."12' The
design of both the U.S. Act and the affirmative fair use defense
intends to strike a balance between the copyright owner and those
wishing to comment or parody the copyright at hand. According to
the noted Legal Realist scholar Wesley Hohfeld, for every right
asserted there is a corresponding legal duty.122 Under this concep-
tion of the power play inherent in the law, in order for Mattel to
win its right to monopolize its copyright, artists have a duty to
abide by the four fair use factors. Mattel's claim, therefore, is theo-
retically not frivolous as it is grounded in the "sound basis"'23 that
its right of copyright corresponds with the duty to abide and com-
ply with the fair use factors.
B. Distinctive fact situations and contexts
The ability for mere factual distinctions to change the law is
key to understanding the unseen benefit of Mattel's defeat in the
instant case. As stated by Wilfrid Rumble, "[t]he unique character
of facts in a case is important, too, because it gives judges an
opportunity to reach a number of competing decisions without out-
right reversal of established rules."'24 What facts are at issue are
imperative in a judge-made prediction as to how the case will be
decided in light of precedent. Legal Realism advances the notion
120. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 1454100 (C.D.Cal.); See also, James B.
Astrachan, Commentary: Court calls Mattel's copyright suit frivolous, Daily Record
(Baltimore, MD) July 2, 2004.
121. Merriam-Webster on-line, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/frivolous (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008).
122. LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 91- 101.
123. Merriam-Webster on-line, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/frivolous (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008).
124. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 69.
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of prediction. "The predictable element [the rule] in it all is what
courts have done in response to the stimuli of the facts of the con-
crete cases before them."'25
In this regard, Mattel's action against Forsythe contributed to
the cannon of fair use case law that will be referenced in future
decisions; the facts and circumstances of Walking Mountain
affords Mattel factual instances upon which to draw and distin-
guish any possible future cases. For instance, the Court's determi-
nation of the third fair use factor, substantiality of the portion
used, rested upon the fact that Forsythe never displayed the entire
head and body;"2 6 the court did not establish a universal, absolute
amount allowable for reproduction of the Barbie doll, rather they
created a 'Forsythe standard' of use. Under the tenets of Legal
Realism, the 'Forsythe standard' is just another factual stimulus27
added to the database of precedent upon which Mattel can access
to make subsequent factual distinctions. If in the future an
infringer uses even one plastic toe more than the 'Forsythe stan-
dard,' Mattel may have a much stronger case. The more circum-
stances Mattel has to draw from, the more facts Mattel will have
in its arsenal with which to make winning distinctions.
Outside of guiding Mattel's actions, this dynamic quality of
the law is almost palpable to the artists. Although a clear victory
for artists, upon discussing the outcome five years after the fact,
Forsythe commented, "People [artists] don't feel particularly safe
... [you] should always be a little bit wary." 28
Although Mattel lost in Walking Mountain, their aggressive
litigation strategy in the United States is justifiable under the
lens of Legal Realism in that judicial interpretation of statutes
and preceding case law shift due to distinguishable facts and soci-
etal pressures. In Canada, Mattel's actions have shown fruit of
this aggressive approach wherein a change occurred due to the
Court's Legal Realist acknowledgment of the looseness inherent in
the language of the law. This justifies that Mattel's actions con-
firm the notion that a shift, although imperceptible, is a shift
nonetheless.
125. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 63 (citing Herman Oliphant, A return to Stare
Decisis, 159 A.B.A.J., XIV (1928)).
126. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 806.
127. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 63 (citing Herman Oliphant, A return to Stare
Decisis, 159 A.B.A.J., XIV (1928)).
128. Telephone Interview with Tom Forsythe, Artist (Dec. 18, 2007).
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IV. MATTEL'S CANADIAN BATTLE: MATTEL, INC. V. 3894207
CANADA INC.
"The Supreme Court broke the heart of the world's most
famous doll yesterday, ruling Mattel Inc. does not have the
exclusive right to use the Barbie name."129
A. Evolution of the legal framework
i. Trade-marks Act
Trademarks are "something of an anomaly in intellectual
property law."13° To understand the significance of the BARBIE
ruling, one must look at its statutory evolution and case law prece-
dent:... the Trade-marks Act... ("Act") and Pink Panther Beauty
Corp. v. United Artist Corp'33 ("Pink Panther"). The Act, as it reads
today, grants a monopoly in relation to the wares or services of the
trademark holder for the express social benefit of assuring cus-
tomers that they are receiving the supplier's actual wares or ser-
vices,3 thus guaranteeing the quality associated with that
particular trademark. 35 Under the initial Unfair Competition Act
of 1932, this monopolistic grant of power over trademarked wares
or services extended only to those wares or services that were
"similar."136
The impetus for change came in 1953 with Dr. Harold G.
Fox's Report of the Trade-mark Law Revision Committee to the
Secretary of State of Canada ("Fox Report"). 37 Notably, the report
suggested that "[s]ome trade-marks are so well known that the
use of the same or similar trade-marks on any wares of any kind
would cause the general purchasing public to believe that the orig-
129. Kirk Makin, Barbie not just a doll, top court rules Trademarks not
unassailable, judges decide in two cases, Globe & Mail (Toronto, Canada) Jun. 3, 2006.
130. Stikeman Elliott, Supreme Court Rules on Famous Mark Protection, Mondaq
Bus. Briefing July 16, 2006.
131. See Julius Melnitzer, The Battle for Trademark Protection, Lexpert, Nov. 2007,
at 49.
132. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
133. Pink Panther Beauty Corp. v. United Artist Corp, (1998), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 247
(F.C.A.), reversing 67 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (F.C.T.D.). Leave to appeal was granted by the
SCC but subsequently withdrawn following a settlement between the parties.
134. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
135. Sophie Picard, The Barbie Case: Fame Is Not Everything, 96 Trademark Rep.
1005, 1056 (2006); See also, Kamleh Nicola, Trademark Protection In Canada: Are
You Official Or Are You Famous, Mondaq Bus. Briefing Dec. 4 2006.
136. Picard, supra note 136, at 1056.
137. Picard, supra note 136, at 1056.
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inal user and owner of the trade-mark was in some way responsi-
ble for the wares to which the use of the mark has been
extended."'38 The Fox Report spurred Parliament's replacement of
the Unfair Competition Act of 1932, to the currently used Act of
1954."9 Evolution of the Act to incorporate the Fox Report codifies
the underlying legislative intent to give a wider ambit of protec-
tion to the trademark holder. " °
The Canadian Courts have not "wholeheartedly embraced"
14
the notion of famous marks as evident in the somewhat conflicting
case law in Canada's jurisprudence.' Prior to Pink Panther, the
Act was interpreted to reflect the principles of the Fox Report;
there was a general trend for the court to interpret the Act to pro-
tect those owners of a famous mark. 4 1 Pink Panther misconstrued
the original intent of the Act and swung the pendulum away from
the protection of famous marks, making it virtually impossible for
the owner of the mark to win. Up until BARBIE, it stood as the
leading interpretation of the Act's determinative phrase: "whether
or not the wares or services are of the same general class" 44 in
regards to Canadian trademark infringement issues.
ii. The Pink Panther
Pink Panther was an action in opposition of trademark regis-
tration by United Artist Corporation, a film studio, against Pink
Panther Beauty Corporation, a hair care and beauty supplier.'45
United Artist opposed the registration on the basis that the Pink
Panther Beauty Corporation's attempted registration of the mark
138. Picard, supra note 136, at 1056.
139. Picard, supra note 136, at 1057.
140. Court throws Mattel's claim on the Barbie, St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minn.) June
3, 2006 (quoting a Mattel representative as stating "Canada's trademark laws, as
drafted over 50 years ago, were always intended to give the widest scope of protection
to famous and well-known marks.").
141. Nicola, supra note 136.
142. Robert MacDonald, Supreme Court of Canada Gives Hope to Owners of
Famous Marks, Mondaq Business Briefing June 13, 2006.
143. John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Steinman, 44 C.P.R. 58 (1965); James Burrough
Ltd. v. Reckitt & Colman (Canada) Ltd., 53 C.P.R. 276 (1967); John Haig & Co. Ltd. v.
Haig Beverages Ltd., 21 C.P.R. (2d) 271 (1975); Carson v. Reynolds, 2 F.C. 685 (1980);
Conde Nast Publications Inc. v. Gozlan Brothers Ltd., 2 C.F. F 912 (1981); Polysar
Ltd. v. Gesco Distributing Ltd., 36 A.C.W.S. (2d) 184 (1985); Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Canada v. Sunlife Juice Ltd., 22 C.P.R. (3d) 244 (1988); Glen Warren Productions
Ltd. v. Gertex Hosiery Ltd., 29 C.P.R. (3d) 7 (1990); Visa International Service Assn.
v. Auto Visa Inc.,41 C.P.R. (3d) 77 (1991); See also, MacDonald, supra note 143.
144. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
145. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247, para. 5.
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PINK PANTHER 4 ' would likely be confused with United Artist's
longstanding registration " 7 of the mark THE PINK PANTHER.'48
United Artists argued that the famous nature of their mark, along
with its diverse association, would logically suggest that "confu-
sion among consumers, no matter the extent of the difference
between the products" was highly likely.'49 The Court disagreed
and the majority set an extremely stringent test for confusion,
noting that without a "connection whatsoever"50 in the wares or
services, a finding of confusion will be rare.'5 ' This is in direct con-
trast to the ideas promulgated by the Fox Report and incorporated
in the governing Act.
An inkling of the impending shift, however, evinces from Jus-
tice McDonald's dissenting opinion. In his dissent, he urged that
the association with similar wares or services in the use of a
famous mark should not preclude the finding of market confu-
sion. "'52 He adds that the allowance of the beauty salon to use the
mark PINK PANTHER would "almost certainly" confuse the aver-
age consumer given the widespread use and longevity of THE
PINK PANTHER mark in the Canadian marketplace and its
widespread diversification. 53  Justice McDonald concludes,
stressing his concern of the Pink Panther majority ruling:
"To come to any other result in the case of such a famous
and widespread trade name as the Pink Panther, in my
opinion, tips the balance too far in favour [sic] of the copy-
cat artist seeking to profit financially from someone else's
creative fortune . . . I believe the [majority] deci-
sion. . .launches trade-mark protection down a slippery
slope which will result in the protection of famous names in
only the very clearest of cases. '
146. THE PINK PANTHER mark was in association with a wide variety of hair
care and beauty product supplies, and in the operation of a business dealing in the
distribution of hair care and beauty product supplies, and instructing and educating
others in the distribution of hair care supplies and beauty products. Pink Panther, 80
C.P.R. 247, para. 5.
147. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247, para. 1 ("The trade mark owned by the studio
was a clearly famous and inherently distinctive one. The studio's mark had been used
in Canada for over 30 years.").
148. See, Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247.
149. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772; Nicola, supra note 136.
150. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247, para. 1.
151. Further, as there was no connection between the wares or services of the
company, any argument based on corporate diversification "should be based on
potential expansion of existing operations." Nicola, supra note 129.
152. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247, para. 1.
153. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247, para. 2.
154. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247.
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The Pink Panther era155 gave "Canada a worldwide reputation
for a soft underbelly on famous trademark enforcement" and left
trademark owners with little hope of protection for their mark
beyond their traditional wares or service line. 156 "Absent a link
between the products or the area of activity, it became virtually
impossible to establish the likelihood of confusion," says Barry
Gamache of Montreal firm Lager Robic Richard L.L.P.151
Pink Panther shifted the pendulum away from the Act's origi-
nal intent in protecting the famous mark. It was not until
BARBIE that the "ambiguous legal language" of the statute was
reexamined. BARBIE did not have the effect of swinging the pen-
dulum back to its place when the Act initially incorporated the
Fox Report, but Mattel's aggressive force rocked its interpretation
from its seemingly static state of inertia, thereby setting the pen-
dulum back into swing. When looked at under the Legal Realist
lens, this shift stemmed from Mattel's aggressiveness; 58 it forced
a new set of factual stimuli 59 before the court and with these new
stimuli came a new conclusion. Although based on the same
"ambiguous legal language" of the Act in issue in Pink Panther,
the BARBIE court retrenched from its strict interpretation, thus
affording a wider protection for the owner of a famous mark. 60
B. The BARBIE case: Background
Mattel brought suit in 2002 against a small chain of Montreal
suburban restaurants named "Barbie's."'6 ' In 1992, 3894207
Canada Inc. began using the name Barbie's when they opened for
business the first of their three restaurants. 62 Barbie's restau-
rants were slated as an adult oriented "bar-and-grill operation"6 3
with items unabashedly featured as cooked on the "barbie-q,"
155. See also, Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lexus Foods, Inc., 2 F.C. 15
(2001).
156. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 50.
157. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 50.
158. Putting Barbie on the Barbie, Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) May 28,
2005 ("A Canadian restaurant owner in invoking Australian slang in its defense in a
David and Goliath court battle against US toymaker Mattel.").
159. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 63 (citing Herman Oliphant, A return to Stare
Decisis, 159 A.B.A.J., XIV (1928)).
160. Picard, supra note 136, at 1067 ("The Supreme Court's decision in the BARBIE
case settled the question as to how the factor of a trade-mark's fame is pertinent in
determining the likelihood of confusion in the minds of prospective consumers.").
161. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 10.
162. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 11.
163. Id.
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along with service of alcoholic beverages. 16
In 1993, 3894207 Canada Inc. applied for the mark BARBIE'S
& Design in association with "restaurant services, take-out ser-
vices, catering and banquet services."165 Mattel opposed registra-
tion of the mark on the grounds of likelihood of marketplace
confusion due to the fame of their established Barbie mark.166 The
primary association for the Barbie mark is dolls, geared towards
the target audience of young girls. Mattel, however, offered evi-
dence that the Barbie mark expands beyond its target audience1 67
and beyond its association purely with dolls, claiming association
with diverse products ranging from cologne and food products to
bikes.68
The Trade-marks Opposition Board of the Canadian Intellec-
tual Property Office ("Board") sided with 3894207 Canada Inc,
accepting the argument that there is no likelihood of confusion;
they allowed the registration.1 69 Both the Federal Court and the
Federal Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed the
Board's decision. 7 °
On June 2, 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") dis-
missed Mattel's appeal and upheld 3894207 Canada Inc.'s regis-
tration as valid, insisting that the BARBIE'S & Design mark,
registered in association with restaurant services, carried no like-
lihood of confusion with Mattel's famous Barbie doll.'71 Similar to
the Walking Mountain ambiguous fair use factors, the SCC used
the flexible test for confusion set out in section six of the Act in
reaching their interpretive decision. 72 The relevant portion of the
Act reads in full as follows:
6. (2) [Idem] The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with
another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the
same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the
wares or services associated with those trade-marks are
manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 10.
167. Target audience girls aged 3 - 11. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 4.
168. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 4 ("[clologne, hand lotion and body lotion," food
products such as "spices, breads, cakes, cereal, coffee, crackers, flour, herbs, pies, ice
cream, pizza," as well as bicycles, backpacks, books and construction pads).
169. Id.
170. Id. (both courts rejected Mattel's introduction of survey evidence proffered to
show the likelihood of confusion between the two marks).
171. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 4.
172. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 74-89.
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person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same
general class.
(5) [What to be considered] In determining whether
trade-marks or trade-names are confusing, the court or the
Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the
surrounding circumstances including
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or
trade-names and the extent to which they have become
known;
(b) the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names
have been in use;
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business;
(d) the nature of the trade; and
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks
or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas sug-
gested by them.'73
The primary issue before the BARBIE court was the same at
issue in Pink Panther: what is the proper interpretation of the
Act's concluding phrase, "whether or not the wares or services are
of the same general class" in relation to a famous mark?" 4 SCC
ultimately held that the fame of the Barbie mark could not trump
the requirement of a connection between the goods or services
offered in order to find likelihood of confusion.'75
The BARBIE court is consistent with the Pink Panther test,
yet "softened the wording."7 8 Under the Legal Realist concept of
prediction, the crux of the BARBIE decision was unsurprising as
based on the Pink Panther Court's rationale. The Pink Panther
Court reasoned that the mark, "The Pink Panther" was (1) clearly
famous and distinct and that (2) the two marks at issue, although
very similar,' were not identical. Additionally, the (3) difference
in the nature of the wares and the divergent nature of the trade of
the two marks".. confirmed their ruling that the two marks do not
risk the likelihood of confusion.'79 The BARBIE Court similarly
found Mattel's Barbie trademark was (1) famous and (2) parallel
to that of 3894207 Canada Inc.'s BARBIE'S & Design mark; it was
173. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
174. Picard, supra note 136, at 1057.
175. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772.
176. Nicola, supra note 136; Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 49 ("[Nlowadays, the
Pink Panther is playing second fiddle to the Barbie doll.").
177. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772 ("The Pink Panther" v. "Pink Panther").
178. Pink Panther, 80 C.P.R. 247 (stating "not a fissure but a chasm"); See also,
Nicola, supra note 136.
179. Nicola, supra note 136; See, Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772.
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not, however, identical to 3894207 Canada Inc.'s opposing mark.
Additionally, the Court determined that (3) the divergence in the
wares and services of Mattel and 3894207 Canada Inc. did not
lead to likelihood of confusion.8 0 As predicted, the Court rejected
extension of broad protection for the famous Barbie mark.'
What was decidedly unpredicted, however, was the Court's
noted "reject[ion of] the limitations placed on the protection of
famous marks by the infamous case of [Pink Panther]."'82 Pink
Panther's18 3 protection of a famous mark "only in exceptional cir-
cumstances, if ever" standard was too constrictive according to the
BARBIE court. Although BARBIE held fame alone cannot "act as
a trump card,"'"' it also slowly eviscerated the Pink Panther stan-
dard.8 ' BARBIE lowered the bar for granting protection to famous
marks, thereby broadening the remedies available to famous
mark holders, such as Mattel.8 6 This initial concession swung the
pendulum in the direction of the wider expanse of protection as
originally proffered by the Fox Report. Thereby, cracking open the
long-closed door in Canadian jurisprudence, consequently ena-
bling famous trademarks to receive broad protection.'87
V. A LOOK AT BARBIE UNDER A LEGAL REALIST LENS
A. Ambiguity of legal language
Mattel should take comfort in this loss. Despite the
entrenched interpretations of the Act, its attack challenging the
180. Nicola, supra note 136.
181. Gary Daniel, et. al., Commonwealth Countries: Marked Goods, Legal Week
Aug. 31, 2006 (commenting on the "low degree of inherent distinctiveness; of its
significance as a common contraction of 'Barbara' and, to some extent, because it had
surname significance.").
182. MacDonald, supra note 143; Daniel, supra note 182; See also, Melnitzer, supra
note 132, at 49 ("The Supreme Court raised the possibility that a mark could be found
to be confusing with a famous trade-mark used in a very different business under
certain circumstances."); Taran Atwal, Supreme Court of Canada Decisions on
"Famous" Trade-marks, Mondaq. Bus. Briefing June 16, 2006.
183. See Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 52 ("Overall the decision in Mattel... can
still be seen as beneficial for owners of famous trademarks in Canada in view of
narrowing down of the decisions in Pink Panther and Lexus."); Daniel, supra note
182.
184. Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772 (2006).
185. In their attempt to soften Pink Panther, the BARBIE Court commented that
"the 'exceptional circumstances if ever' test puts the bar too high. id.
186. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 49.
187. MacDonald, supra note 143 ("As a result, owners of famous marks can be
better assured that, in the appropriate circumstances, their trade marks will be fully
protected in Canada.").
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use of their Barbie mark has proved to be a tangible boon, more so
than the theoretical boon seen in their aggressive challenged to
the U.S. Act. In establishing the likelihood of confusion under the
Act, a trademark's fame has become just one factor considered. 18
The SCC openly views the Act through a Legal Realist lens and
notes that the listed circumstances considered under the Act are
not exhaustive and that each factor considered is governed by a
context-specific analysis.'89 Consistent with the Legal Realist
approach, the inherent ambiguity of the Act resulted in the
BARBIE court expressing a different interpretation of the same
statutory language at issue in Pink Panther. Where the Pink Pan-
ther court found resemblance of wares or services singular in an
Act analysis and imperative to determining the likelihood of con-
fusion, the BARBIE court did not. The BARBIE court noted that
not only is resemblance not paramount, it is also "clearly not a
requirement under [the Act] ." '90 They go further to state that Pink
Panther's requirement that the contested marks be at least of the
same general class is not necessary and that "[a] trade-
mark's fame is capable of carrying the mark across product lines
where lesser marks would be circumscribed to their traditional
wares or services ... If, in the end, the result of the use of the new
mark would be to introduce confusion into the marketplace, it
should not be permitted." 9' Mattel's actions forced the reconsider-
ation of this issue by the SCC. This push opened the door for pro-
tection of famous marks and gave credence to the Legal Realist
notion that statutory interpretations are not strict and with a lit-
tle creativity "will catch or let out the situation you are
deciding."'92
B. Social and economic change
In BARBIE, it was the phrase "whether or not the wares or ser-
vices are of the same general class" of the Act that bore interpreta-
tion. Although the wording "will not change verbally,"19 3 shifts in
surrounding social and economic norms and pressures alter a
court's interpretation of that word(s). It is this "celerity and per-
188. Nicola, supra note 136.
189. Elliott, supra note 131; See also, Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 5 ("The
general class of wares and services, while relevant, is not controlling.").
190. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 5.
191. Id.
192. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 64.
193. LEVI, supra note 43, at 32.
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vasiveness of social change"'94 that lead to BARBIE being her-
alded as putting Canadian trademark law "back on course,"195
thereby closer in step to the trademark laws of the United
States.196 "Canada was definitely the international odd duck in
the aftermath of Pink Panther," says Daniel Drapeau of Ogilvy
Renault L.L.P. in Montreal.'97 With increased globalization, there
is increased pressure to modernize the Canadian trademark poli-
cies to those of its bordering country, the United States.9 ' With
the SCC's decision in BARBIE, no longer can Canada be consid-
ered the "odd duck"'99 in the international intellectual property
pond. It was in the face of the entrenched case and statutory inter-
pretations that Mattel's aggressive approach secured a small vic-
tory for Mattel; this movement towards synchronization enables
this California-based corporation to strategically and efficiently
approach future trans-border trademark conflicts. 00
VI. CONCLUSION
"The legal system is little more than a boxing ring for the
rich with the common people not even invited to experience
the proceedings on Pay Per View." -Tom Forsythe 0'
In the face of entrenched intellectual property law, Mattel's
aggressive control over their icon garners it, in both the United
194. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 66 ("New instruments of production, new modes of
travel and of dwelling, new credit and ownership devices, new concentrations of
capital, new social customs, habits, aims and ideals- all these factors of innovation
make vain the hope that definitive legal rules can be drafted that will forever after
solve all legal problems.").
195. MacDonald, supra note 143; Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 54 ("while the SCC
rulings may not be a sea change, the currents have swerved.").
196. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 54-55 (quoting Douglas Wolf, co-chair of the
trademark and copyright group at Wolf, Greenfield & Sack, P.C.: "The decision[]
should be welcomed as bringing Canadian law back into step with the international
standards on the protection of famous marks."); See also, MacDonald, supra note 143.
197. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 50.
198. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 49 ("In recent years, major global corporations
have discovered that owning a famous trademark is not all it's cracked up to be in
Canada - especially when compared to the protection given to their trademarks in the
U.S. and Europe.").
199. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 50.
200. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 54-55 (quoting Douglas Wolf, co-chair of the
trademark and copyright group at Wolf, Greenfield & Sack, P.C.: "Canada and the
U.S. are now so close in terms of the law and cases on trademark protection that
companies on both sides of the border should be guided by the same strategic
considerations in assessing the questions of infringement relating to famous marks.").
201. Tom Forsythe Artsurdism, http://creativefreedomdefense.org/bio-foodchain.
cfm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
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States and Canada, the reputation as Goliath, °2 a relentless bully
fighting a fruitless battle. After an embrace of Legal Realist phi-
losophy, however, Mattel's repute shifts from Goliath to that of a
Silver Knight - a corporation making gallant strides in its ulti-
mate battle to protect its princess, Barbie.
Although Mattel lost in the case of Walking Mountain, their
aggressive litigation strategy in the United States is justifiable
under the lens of Legal Realism due to variable interpretations of
ambiguous legal language and shifts due to distinguishable facts
and societal pressures. Legal Realists explicate the notion that
statutory language is ambiguous and not self-expounding." 3 Mat-
tel's continual battle in the face of detrimentally entrenched inter-
pretations of the U.S. Act confirms that it has embraced the Legal
Realist's conception of ambiguity. Further, simply by bringing
suit, the facts and circumstances of Walking Mountain affords
Mattel "factual stimuli""4 which could be the determining factor
in future cases.
Even though there is no tangible victory to date for Mattel in
the United States, it appears its policy to keep fighting adds the
effect of putting its opponents on the defense, thereby frustrating
possible use of Barbie due to the threat of potential lawsuit. Artist
Tom Forsythe commented on this chilling effect resulting from
Mattel's aggressive stance in the United States noting, "You can
fight these things and win but it is always a pain to be sued."205
Unlike the proposed theoretical changes stemming from the
Mattel's strategy in the United States, this aggressive stance has
already proved successful in Canada.0 6 It created imperceptible
shifts in statutory interpretation, consequently bringing Cana-
dian trademark law more in line with that of the United States.
Consistent with the Legal Realist approach, the inherent
ambiguity of the Act resulted in the BARBIE Court reinterpreting
202. Editorial, Throwing Barbie on the Barbie ruled OK, if it's art, The Austr.
(Australia), July 3, 2004, at 1 (commenting on Mattel's reputation in the United
States); Putting Barbie on the Barbie, Daily Tel. (Sydney, Australia), May 28, 2005
(commenting on Mattel's reputation in Canada by stating, "A Canadian restaurant
owner in invoking Australian slang in its defense in a David and Goliath court battle
against US toymaker Mattel.").
203. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 66; JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 299 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) ("The
serpent in the imagined garden of Eden is the irrepressible semantic problem.").
204. RUMBLE, supra note 22, at 63 (citing Herman Oliphant, A return to Stare
Decisis, 159 A.B.A.J., XIV (1928)).
205. Telephone Interview with Tom Forsythe, Artist (Dec. 18, 2007).
206. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 54.
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the same statutory language at issue in Pink Panther. BARBIE
loosened the Pink Panther's "only in exceptional circumstances, if
ever" standard and held that the factors to be considered under
the Act are not all-inclusive. Where Pink Panther found resem-
blance of wares or services imperative to providing famous mark
protection, the BARBIE Court expounded that not only is resem-
blance not paramount, it is also not a clear requirement. °7
Although not a "slam-dunk"0 8 for Mattel, this concession brought
Canadian trademark law closer in-line with the wider expanse of
protection as originally sought by the Act.209
Walking Mountain and BARBIE are both reflective of
instances wherein Mattel fought against the then existing status
of law. Although Mattel did not prevail in either case, both mark a
slow erosion of the entrenched copyright and trademark laws
against large corporations such as Mattel.
207. Mattel, Inc., 1 S.C.R. 772, para. 5.
208. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 54.
209. Melnitzer, supra note 132, at 54 ("The Supreme Court's interpretation of Pink
Panther brings us closer to what we thought the law used to be in Canada.").
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